Sexual Harassment from the Victim\u27s Perspective: The Need for the Seventh Circuit to Adopt the Reasonable Woman Standard by Piefer, Sally A.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 77
Issue 1 Fall 1993 Article 5
Sexual Harassment from the Victim's Perspective:
The Need for the Seventh Circuit to Adopt the
Reasonable Woman Standard
Sally A. Piefer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Sally A. Piefer, Sexual Harassment from the Victim's Perspective: The Need for the Seventh Circuit to Adopt the Reasonable Woman Standard,
77 Marq. L. Rev. 85 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol77/iss1/5
COMMENTS
SEXUAL HARASSMENT FROM THE VICTIM'S
PERSPECTIVE: THE NEED FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT TO ADOPT THE REASONABLE
WOMAN STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION
As many as fifty percent of all women will experience sexual harass-
ment' at some point in their working career.2 However, a 1988 study
indicates that the incidence of sexual harassment for women entering
traditionally male occupations is more accurately in the vicinity of sev-
enty-five percent.3 Sexual harassment has become seriously pervasive
over the years; from 1980 to 1988 the number of charges of sexual har-
assment filed rose from seventy-five to a staggering 7037.4 Women dis-
proportionately face the brunt of sexual harassment,5 and the
harassment befalls women of all cultures, ages, and occupations.6 The
consequences of sexual harassment, as one can imagine, are crippling.7
1. A renowned author on the topic of sexual harassment defines sexual harassment as
"the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal
power." CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WoMEN: A CASE
OF SEx DISCRIMINATON 1 (1979).
2. BARBARA A. Gtnux, SEx AND Tm WoRKPLAcE 44 (1985).
3. A1BA CoNrrE, SExUAL HARAssmENr IN m WORKPLAcE: LAW AND PRACTIcE 2
(1991). A study conducted by the United States Merit Systems Protection Board indicated
that 42% of all women and only 15% of all men were subjected to some form of sexual harass-
ment. Id. at 1; see also WILLIAM PEmocmunt & BARBARA K. REPA, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
ON Tm JOB 6113 (1992) (An Equal Employment Opportunity Commission spokesperson ad-
vised that 728 sexual harassment complaints were filed during the first quarter of 1991, and
1244 were filed during the first quarter of 1992.); Joan Fluegel, Anti-Discrimination Law-
Sexual Harassment and Battery: Mutually Exclusive Remedies for Independent Harms, 17 WM.
MrrcHELL L. REv. 627, 628 (1991) (stating that "[w]omen are two and one half times more
likely to be harassed by supervisors than their male colleagues").
4. See CoNmE, supra note 3, at 3.
5. GuTrm, supra note 2, at 54-55.
6. CoN-r, supra note 3, at 6; see also Fluegel, supra note 3, at 628; Alberta I. Cook, The
New Bias Battleground: Sex Harassmen4 NAT'L LJ., July 7, 1986, at 11. Because women are
subjected to greater incidents of sexual harassment than are men, this Comment will focus
exclusively on the sexual harassment of women.
7. See CoNTE, supra note 3, at 8. Examples of the consequences of sexual harassment
include work disruptions, financial burdens for both the employee as well as the employer,
and personal burdens. Id. at 8-9. One survey indicated that a typical Fortune 500 company
faces an estimated cost of $282.53 per employee per year (exclusive of litigation expenses)
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:85
A primary reason for the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the
workplace is that women regard sexual behavior in the workplace as un-
acceptable and improper, while men more often view the same conduct
as proper and jointly desired.8 Conduct in the workplace that many men
view as commonplace and acceptable may insult women co-workers.9
Furthermore, when some women lodge complaints against male co-
workers or supervisors because of what they perceive as offensive work-
place conduct, they are frequently advised that such conduct should be
expected in the workplace.' °
The standard for evaluating the suitability of behavior in the work-
place has evolved from the historically gender-neutral "reasonable man"
standard to the more recently advanced "reasonable person" standard."
Utilizing the latter standard to assess sexual harassment in the workplace
requires the factfinder to determine whether the offensive behavior was
adequately pervasive and severe enough to alter employment conditions
by creating an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment."'12
responding to sexual harassment complaints. Id. at 9. Conversely, implementing policies
aimed at preventing sexual harassment would amount to a cost of merely $8.41 per employee.
Id.
8. GUTEK, supra note 2, at 88-92; see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and
the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1210 (1989).
9. GUTrm, supra note 2, at 43. The table below indicates what men and women perceive
to be sexual harassment in the workplace:
Males Females
Complimentary comments 21.9% 33.5%
Insulting comments 70.3 85.5
Complimentary looks, gestures 18.9 28.9
Insulting looks, gestures 61.6 80.3
Nonsexual touching 6.6 7.3
Sexual touching 58.6 84.3
Expected socializing 91.1 95.8
Expected sexual activity 94.5 98.0
Id.
10. Jill L. Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Travelled
and the Distance Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 445, 456 (1981).
11. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3,
21-22 (1988). It is believed the reasonable man standard appeared in tort law in the early
1800s. Randy T. Austin, Comment, Better Off with the Reasonable Man Dead or the Reason-
able Man Did the Darndest Things, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 479, 481 (1992) (citing W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 174 (5th ed. 1984)).
The law now recognizes the reasonable person standard to eliminate the manifest gender bias
of the reasonable man. See Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A
Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333, 362, n.116 (1990).
12. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992); see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990); Henson
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The "reasonable woman" standard 13 was first set forth in a 1986 Sixth
Circuit dissenting opinion authored by Judge Damon Keith as a standard
for assessing behavior alleged in sexual harassment claims.' 4 The stan-
dard was used with approval only one year later by a different panel
from the Sixth Circuit'" and has since been used with increasing fre-
quency.' 6 In employing the reasonable woman standard, the courts have
focused on the rudimentary discrepancies in the viewpoints of women
and men. 7
This Comment first surveys the history of sexual harassment in the
workplace as a viable cause of action.'8 Second, this Comment ad-
dresses the development and approval of the reasonable woman stan-
dard and examines cases and courts that have adopted this standard in
examining behavior in sexual harassment cases. Third, this Comment
scrutinizes the progression of sexual harassment cases in the Seventh
Circuit and its adoption of a two-pronged analysis. Finally, this Com-
ment sets forth logic for adoption of the reasonable woman standard by
the Seventh Circuit and how adoption of this standard would not only
deter prevailing discriminatory practices in the workplace, but also
would balance the respective positions of men and women in the
workplace.
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982); Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 715 F.
Supp. 1496, 1499 (D. Colo. 1987), aff'd, 878 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1989).
13. "[E]xhaustive research has unearthed no common-law reference to a 'reasonable wo-
man."' Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the "Rea-
sonable Man," 8 Ru-r.-CAs. L.J. 311, 315 (1977).
14. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). Judge Keith concluded:
In my view, the reasonable person perspective fails to account for the wide divergence
between most women's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men....
Moreover, unless the outlook of the reasonable woman is adopted, the defendants as
well as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior
fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men.
Id. (citations omitted).
15. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987).
16. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F.
Supp. 424, 428-29 (D. Ariz. 1992); Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp. 283, 295
(E.D. Pa. 1991); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (D. Me. 1991);
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Lipsett v.
Rive-Mora, 669 F. Supp. 1188,1199 (D. P.R. 1987), rev'd in part sub nor. Lipsett v. University
of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
17. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879-81; see also GUTEK, supra note 2, at 88-92; Peter Linzer &
Patricia A. Tidwell, Letter to David Dow-Friendly Critic and Critical Friend, 28 Hous. L.
REv. 861, 862 (1991).
18. The expression "sexual harassment" became widely used in 1976. MAcKINNON, supra
note 1, at 27.
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II. HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196419 was enacted by Congress
to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers"
in employment.20 This section of the Act is said to have expanded the
potential domain of governmental intercession in employment practices
of employers.2 ' Title VII has also been labeled an imperative instrument
in abdicating discrimination in employment.22 Title VII states that it is
unlawful for employers:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of
such individual's ... sex.. .; or (2) to limit, segregate or classify
* . . employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities ... because of... sex .... I
The addition of "sex" to the balance of Title VII's proscriptions was
added at the last minute in an attempt by opponents to "clock" the bill
on the floor of the House of Representatives. 24 The controlling argu-
ment opposing this amendment was that sex discrimination was suffi-
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
20. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
21. Charles T. Schmidt, Jr., Title VII: Coverage and Comments, 7 B.C. INDus. & COM. L.
REv. 459 (1966); see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901
(11th Cir. 1982).
22. Robert F. Conte & David L. Gregory, Sexual Harassment in Employment-Some Pro-
posals Toward More Realistic Standards of Liability, 32 DRAKE L. REv. 407, 415 (1982-83).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). The full text of this subsection makes it unlawful:
(1) [T]o fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate or classify his [or her] employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his [or her] status as an em-
ployee because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
An employer under Title VII is one who is (1) engaged in industry that affects commerce
and (2) has 15 or more employees working each working day for 20 or more calendar weeks in
the present or preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). Excluded from this defi-
nition are the United States government, corporations wholly owned by the government, In-
dian tribes, and bona fide private membership clubs exempt from taxation. Id.
24. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Francis J. Vaas, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 431, 441-42 (1966) (Representative Smith
proposed the amendment adding "sex" to the bill's proscriptions "in a spirit of satire and
ironic cajolery."). The ultimate purpose of its proposition was to allegedly prevent Title VII
from being enacted. Christine Neylon O'Brien et al., Employer Fetal Protection Policies at
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ciently distinctive from the other proscribed behavior that it should
receive individual legislative treatment.25 No hearings were held on the
proposed amendment, and it was swiftly adopted after impetuous debate
on the floor of the House of Representatives, passing by a vote of 168 to
133.26 The lack of a developed and intricate legislative history has left
courts without a sufficient and succinct guide to interpret the actual in-
tentions of Congress.27 Without discerning Congress's full intentions in
adding sex discrimination to proscribed employment practices, the
courts have chosen to give the Act a broad interpretation.
28
B. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Along with the enactment of Title VII, Congress created an adminis-
trative agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), as Title VII's governing body.29 Congress delegated to the
EEOC the administration and enforcement of federal laws prohibiting
workplace discrimination.3" The EEOC is the federal agency responsi-
ble for receiving, investigating, and processing employment discrimina-
tion complaints.31 If reasonable cause is discovered through an
investigation, the EEOC is authorized to conciliate the complaint32 and,
failing that, is empowered to file suit in federal district court on behalf of
the employee.33
Work- Balancing Reproductive Hazards with Title VII Rights, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 147, 184
(1991).
25. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986).
26. Vaas, supra note 24, at 442. The House of Representatives' debate on the amendment
adding sex to proscribed discriminatory practices enveloped only nine pages in the Congres-
sional Record. Id.
27. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64; Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987.
28. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972) ("This language evinces a Congressional intention to define discrimination in the
broadest possible terms.") The Rogers court further required that "the [Equal Employment
Opportunity] Commission must be permitted to view a complainant's charge in its broadest
reasonable sense." Id. at 240; see also Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198
(7th Cir.), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) ("Congress intended to strike at the entire spec-
trum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.").
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1 (1992). The EEOC is a bipartisan committee consisting of five
members who are principally accountable for managing and executing federal laws prohibiting
employment discrimination. J. Clay Smith, Jr., Prologue to the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual
Harassment, 10 CAP. U. L. Rnv. 471, 471 (1981).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1 (1992).
31. Id. § 1601.15 (1992). Many states also have a state administrative body for filing com-
plaints concurrently with the EEOC.
32. Id. § 1601.24.
33. Id. § 1601.27.
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If the EEOC determines that reasonable cause is nonexistent or de-
cides not to file suit, it must so advise the employee by forwarding a
"Notice of Right to Sue" letter.34 The employee can then personally file
suit within ninety days of receipt of the notice.35 Generally, employees
may not sue until the "Right to Sue" letter is issued.36
After its creation, the Commission recognized that workplace harass-
ment based on proscribed issues violated Title VII.37 In 1980, the Com-
mission established the Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex
(the "Guidelines"), specifically providing that sexual harassment vio-
lated Title VII.38 The Guidelines define sexual harassment as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's em-
ployment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.39
A factor that contributed to creating the language of the Guidelines
was the complication experienced in creating a clear definition which
would cover a wide variety of workplace conduct.4" To determine
whether certain conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the EEOC ex-
amines the account of alleged discriminatory conduct in its entirety,
looking at the aggregate of the circumstances.4 Although the EEOC's
34. Id. §§ 1601.19, 1601.28.
35. Id. § 1601.28(e)(1).
36. PErROCELLI & REPA, supra note 3, at 6/36.
37. Smith, supra note 29, at 471.
38. Id. at 472.
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992).
40. Smith, supra note 29, at 473. "This difficulty is due to the fact that the same actions
which, under one set of circumstances, would constitute sexual harassment, might, under an-
other set of circumstances, constitute acceptable social behavior." Id. at 473-74.
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1992); see also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69
(1986) (agreeing with the EEOC's Guidelines in emphasizing the Court's need to view the
record as a whole and consider the totality of the circumstances). The courts recognize that
for a prima facie showing of sexual harassment, the conduct must constitute more than "spo-
radic" conduct. Barbetta v. Chemlawn Serv. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569,572-73 (W.D.N.Y. 1987);
see also Christine 0. Merriman & Cora G. Yang, Note, Employer Liability for Co-Worker
Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. Rnv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 95 (1984-85)
("[M]ost courts have failed to recognize that isolated, sporadic, or insulting incidents of har-
assment may violate Title VII.").
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Guidelines are not mandatory or precedential in any case, courts grant
this administrative interpretation great deference.4' The purpose of the
1980 amendment to the Guidelines was to facilitate judicial and employ-
ment comprehension of the nature of proscribed workplace conduct.4 3
The Guidelines can be interpreted to protect against both solitary as well
as widespread occurrences of sexual harassment.44 The resulting support
in favor of the Guidelines has stimulated victims of workplace sexual
harassment to file claims in greater numbers. 45 The final effect of the
EEOC's Guidelines, in conjunction with judicial interpretation of them,
is the growth of sexual harassment law practice.46
III. ELEMENTs OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
The EEOC and its Guidelines recognize two separate theories of sex-
ual harassment. These theories are classically known as (1) quid pro quo
sexual harassment 47 and (2) hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment. 8 Each of these theories is discussed below.
A. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
Under quid pro quo sexual harassment, the employer conditions fu-
ture employment on demands for sexual favors.49 By using sex in this
fashion, the employer makes sex a term or condition of employment.5 0
In quid pro quo cases, the courts recognize that conditioning future em-
ployment on sexual favors creates a very strong potential for loss of tan-
gible job benefits."' These tangible benefits include adverse
42. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). The Griggs court stated,
"Since the Act and its legislative history support the Commission's construction, this affords
good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress." Id. at 434.
43. Smith, supra note 29, at 472.
44. Merriman & Yang, supra note 41, at 95. The courts, however, have not taken such a
liberal construction. Barbetta, 669 F. Supp. at 572-73.
45. CoNITr, supra note 3, at 3.
46. Id. at 1-9.
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (1992).
48. Id. § 1604.11(a)(3).
49. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 'he employer subjected his
female employee to various requests for sexual favors, which would result in favorable treat-
ment at work. The employer requested that she accompany him to social outings after work-
ing hours and have a sexual relationship with him. She refused the advances, and her position
with the company was ultimately abolished. Id.
50. Elaine Frost, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 71 Wo~mN's L.. 19 (1985).
51. Corr, supra note 3, at 16.
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employment appraisals, denial of job benefits, transfers, demotions, or
even termination.52
An employee needs to establish the existence of five factors to state a
prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment. Those factors are:
(1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) he or she was subject
to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or re-
quests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the
harassment affects the employee's terms or conditions of employment;
and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.53 During the mid-
1980s, quid pro quo sexual harassment actions were far more numerous
than hostile work environment actions.54
B. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
In hostile work environment sexual harassment cases, the employee
is required to sustain her (or his) employment in an abusive or offensive
environment regardless of whether any "tangible job detriment" is suf-
fered. In creating a hostile work environment, the employee may be
subjected to sexual jokes, sexual threats or insults,56 or even sexual pho-
tographs or magazines in the workplace.5 7
To establish a prima facie showing of hostile work environment sex-
ual harassment, the employee must prove the existence of factors that
are essentially identical to those required for quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment. The elements for hostile work environment sexual harassment in-
clude: (1) the employee belonged to a protected group; (2) the employee
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment com-
plained of was based on sex; (4) the harassment complained of affected a
term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir.
1986); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065
(1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982).
54. Merriman & Yang, supra note 41, at 87.
55. See, e.g., Henson, 682 F.2d at 901. The employee was subjected to sexual inquiries and
vulgar language in addition to being asked to engage in sexual relations with her supervisor.
Id.
56. Paul, supra note 11, at 334.
57. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
Paul, supra note 11, at 334 ("[Sexual harassment] can encompass anything from the verbal and
pictorial (crude language, lewd pictures placed on co-workers' desks, sexual limericks in-
scribed on bathroom stalls, off-color jokes) to offensive physical acts (touching, brushing
against, grabbing, indecent exposure).").
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or should have known of the harassment and failed to engage in curative
action.58
C. Development of Judicial Interpretation of Sexual Harassment
The first case to recognize a discriminatory work environment as a
cause of action was decided in 1971, seven years after the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.s9 Courts first acknowledged quid pro quo
sexual harassment, as opposed to hostile work environment sexual har-
assment, as a cause of action.60 When an employer conditions future
employment on sexual demands, that conduct is a contributing factor to
creating a form of discrimination.6'
Courts have acknowledged that employers should be held strictly ac-
countable for this conduct, even if engaged in by a mere supervisor.62
However, liability was premised on the employer's knowledge of the dis-
criminatory conduct.63 At this early juncture, the courts also recognized
that not all sexually laden conduct at the workplace was actionable. 64
After enactment of the EEOC's Guidelines in 1980, however, a strict
liability standard was adopted for quid pro quo sexual harassment by
58. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir.
1988); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987).
59. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
"[T]he relationship between an employee and his [or her] working environment is of such
significance as to be entitled to statutory protection." Id. at 237-38. The employee, a female
of minority ethnicity, was a nurse and was restricted to assisting only patients of a certain
ethnic origin. Id.
60. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The employer solicited a sexual rela-
tionship with his secretary in return for an "enhanced" employment status. Id. at 985 (MacK-
innon, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 990 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). The court also asserted that this conduct may
constitute a criminal violation as well. Id. at 995.
62. Id. at 1000. The court believed employer liability was premised on the wording of
Title VII and the EEOC's guidelines. Id. at 997. The court reviewed three premises for em-
ployer liability:
(1) [I]f ambiguous conduct might be violative of the statute, the employer is in the best
position to know the real cause, and to come forward with an explanation; (2) the
employer, not the employee, can establish prophylactic rules which, without upsetting
efficiency, could obviate the circumstances of potential discrimination; [and] (3) the
type of conduct at issue is questionable at best, and it is not undesirable to induce
careful employers to err on the side of avoiding possibly violative conduct.
Id. at 998.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 999 ("[The advances themselves might be welcome."); see also Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Of course, neither the courts nor the
[E.E.O.C.] have suggested that every instance of sexual harassment gives rise to a Title VII
claim against an employer.. ").
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supervisory personnel, regardless of whether the employee complained
or whether the employer was oblivious 'to the conduct.65
As previously noted, a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual har-
assment is based on the establishment of five criteria.66 It is frequently
admitted by both parties that the employee belongs to a protected class
and that the harassment is based on sex.67 Once the plaintiff establishes
quid pro quo sexual harassment, the burden shifts to the employer to
rebut the presumption of sexual harassment by offering authorized,
noncircumspect justifications for the employment decision.68 A plaintiff
may prove the existence of quid pro quo sexual harassment, for which an
employer may be strictly liable, from a single, isolated occurrence. 69
In 1981, courts inescapably acknowledged that sexual harassment
which does not result in the loss of tangible job benefits was also a form
of illegal discrimination based on sex.70 The circuit court coined the
phrase "discriminatory environment" to define this model of actionable
sexual harassment.7' This hostile work environment sexual harassment
has also been labeled "noneconomic," "absolute," or "intangible" sexual
harassment.72
Establishing a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual
harassment also requires the employee to prove the existence of five fac-
tors.73 Again, it is usually undisputed that the complaining employee is a
member of a protected class and the harassment is based on sex.74 The
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1992); see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 910 ("We hold that an
employer is strictly liable for the actions of its supervisors that amount to sexual discrimina-
tion or sexual harassment resulting in tangible job detriment to the subordinate employee.").
66. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
67. Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986). These same factors are
also generally not disputed in hostile work environment cases. Id.
68. Guiden v. Southeastern Pub. Serv. Auth., 760 F. Supp. 1171, 1178 (E.D. Va. 1991)
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
69. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987). Hostile work environment sexual harassment, however, may not result in liabil-
ity for single, isolated occurrences. Id.; see also Krista J. Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort
Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1469 (1986) (Even
though the EEOC's Guidelines allow for recovery for a single episode, courts require a pat-
tern of sexually harassing conduct for a cause of action to survive in hostile work environment
claims.).
70. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Henson v. City of Dun-
dee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) ("There is no requirement that an employee subjected
to such disparate treatment prove in addition that she has suffered tangible job detriment.").
71. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 945.
72. Merriman & Yang, supra note 41, at 85-86.
73. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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factor that is significantly disputed is whether the conduct was unwel-
come.7" To be unwelcome, the courts have said the employee (1) must
not solicit or invite the conduct, and (2) the employee must see the con-
duct as distasteful.76 The difficulty arises in proving that the conduct is
unwelcome and repugnant when it occurred.77 To aid in resolving the
question of welcomeness, the courts have relied heavily on the EEOC's
Guidelines.78
The Guidelines indicate that sexual harassment creates a hostile
work environment where the conduct is intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive, and substantially interferes with work performance.79 In making
this assessment, the courts require the conduct to be "sufficiently perva-
sive" in altering working conditions.8 0 However, the Supreme Court re-
cently concluded that the conduct need not be severe enough to alter the
victim's psychological well-being or require the victim to suffer injury in
order to be actionable.81 Both the courts and the EEOC Guidelines sug-
gest that pervasiveness of the offensive conduct is determined by a "to-
tality of the circumstances test."' 2 The courts have generally concluded
a hostile work environment exists where more than one isolated, offen-
sive occurrence transpires.8 3
The United States Supreme Court expressly recognized the existence
of sexual harassment as sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.84 The Court, in adopting the advice of the Guidelines, held a
75. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); Moylan v. Maries County, 792
F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
76. Moylan, 792 F.2d at 749.
77. PETROCELLI & REPA, supra note 3, at 2/23.
78. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991).
79. Id. at 877. The Guidelines deem sexual harassment includes "conduct [that] has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creat-
ing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11a(3)
(1992).
80. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
81. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367,371 (1993). The Court indicated that focus-
ing on whether the victim's psychological well-being was affected or whether the victim suf-
fered injury could "needlessly focus the factfinder's attention on concrete psychological harm,
an element [that] Title VII does not require." Id.
82. Id. Circumstances that courts may consider include "the frequency of the discrimina-
tory conduct; its severity;, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offen-
sive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."
Id.
83. Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746,749 (8th Cir. 1986); Vermett v. Hough, 627 F.
Supp. 587, 605-06 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
84. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment when no
tangible or economic benefits are sacrificed.85 Thus, a violation of Title
VII can be established by demonstrating that the sexual discrimination
gave rise to a "hostile or abusive work environment. 8
6
In Meritor, Michelle Vinson was hired as a bank teller and was ulti-
mately promoted to the position of assistant branch manager. Vinson
brought a Title VII action against her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, alleging
she had been victimized by Taylor in the form of sexual harassment.
a7
Vinson testified that Taylor sought sexual relations with her, claiming
she "owed him" for acquiring her job for her." She initially rejected his
solicitations, but ultimately surrendered for fear of losing her job.89 Vin-
son testified she was also subjected to other forms of sexual harassment:
Taylor had forcibly raped her several times both during and after busi-
ness hours; he exposed himself to her in the ladies room, and fondled her
when other employees were present. 90 Vinson chose not to report the
degrading and offensive conduct because she was fearful of Taylor, who
had previously threatened her life.91
The Supreme Court concluded Taylor's conduct violated not only Ti-
tle VII, but criminal law as well.92 In violating Title VII, the Court con-
cluded Taylor could not state an affirmative defense by claiming Vimson
consented to the sexual conduct. 93 The Court arrived at its decision by
determining whether the sexual advances were "unwelcome." 94
The Court also addressed the issue of employer liability for hostile
work environment sexual harassment.95 The Court of Appeals earlier
concluded that employers should be strictly liable for sexual harassment,
both quid pro quo and hostile work environment, engaged in by supervi-
85. Id. at 64.
86. Id. at 66.
87. Id. at 59-60.
88. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 143 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. PSFS Say. Bank
v. Vinson, 474 U.S. 815 (1985), and affd sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986).
89. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
90. Id. Although Vinson was not the only employee to be sexually harassed by Taylor, no
internal reports were ever made regarding any of the conduct. Id. at 60-61.
91. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1980).
92. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
93. Id. at 68. "[T]he fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the sense that the
complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harass-
ment suit brought under Title VII." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 69-73.
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sory personnel.96 The Supreme Court rejected this analysis, concluding
that imposing absolute employer liability for hostile work environment
sexual harassment was erroneous. 7
The Court agreed with the amicus curiae brief filed by the EEOC
regarding employer liability for hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment.98 The EEOC argued that Congress intended traditional agency
principles to apply in determining employer liability.99 Although the
Court refrained from deciding the issue of employer liability in hostile
work environment cases, the Court's decision went a long way in abro-
gating workplace sexual harassment where only a hostile or offensive
environment was created without the loss of tangible job benefits.100
IV. STANDARDS FOR SEXUAL HARASSMvEr CLAIMS
A. Evolution of the Reasonable Woman Standard
Although the Supreme Court has not been presented with the oppor-
tunity to expand the scope of hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment, federal district court and court of appeals decisions reveal an
evolution in defining sexual harassment by that which a reasonable wo-
man would consider hostile or offensive.' 0 '
The earliest standard articulated by the courts was the "reasonable
man standard" or the "man of ordinary prudence." 0 2 The reasonable
96. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 147 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. PSFS Say. Bank
v. Vinson, 474 U.S. 815 (1985), and affd sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986).
97. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 70. The Court stated of the EEOC's brief:
Examination of those principles has led the EEOC to the view that where a supervisor
exercises the authority actually delegated to him by his employer, by making or threat-
ening to make decisions affecting the employment status of his subordinates, such ac-
tions are properly imputed to the employer whose delegation of authority empowered
the supervisor to undertake them.
Id. (citation omitted). The issue of employer liability created a five to four split. Justice Mar-
shall, writing for the concurrence, argued that "there is... no justification for a special rule, to
be applied only in 'hostile environment' cases, that sexual harassment does not create em-
ployer liability until the employee suffering the discrimination notifies other supervisors." Id.
at 77 (Marshall, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 65-67; see also CorNIr, supra note 3, at 52 ("[I]n this decision the Supreme
Court took an important step towards legitimizing this elusive area of law for complainants
and putting employers and harassers on notice that unwelcome sexual conduct will not be
tolerated in the workplace.").
101. Steven H. W'mterbauer, Sexual Harassment-The Reasonable Woman Standard, 7
LAB. L. 811 (1991).102. Bender, supra note 11, at 21 (citations omitted).
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man standard was originally believed to be a generic, genderless stan-
dard, referring to men and women alike.103 Although legal writers claim
the standard is used generically, studies indicate that today's society still
automatically envisions males when they hear the phrase "reasonable
man. o104
The reasonable man standard has become outdated.10 5 Recognizing
the manifest sexism in the standard, courts adopted the "reasonable per-
son" standard.10 6 The perception was that because the reasonable man
lost his genderless interpretation, the reasonable person would replace
him as the new universal and gender-neutral standard.0 7 Legal scholars,
however, continue to contend that altering terminology without chang-
ing the underlying conception of the term is useless because women are
still required to conform to the male perspective of reasonableness. 08
Research indicates that there are no common-law references to the
reasonable woman standard. 0 9 The reasonable woman standard devel-
oped to account for the differences in the perspectives of men and wo-
men regarding appropriate workplace conduct." 0 The reasonable
woman standard contemplates the female perspective for assessing be-
havior that was previously reflected in male viewpoints."' The legal sys-
103. See id. at 22.
104. FLORA JOHNSON, VERTABIM: WORDS BETWEEN THE SEXES 64 (1980); Collins, supra
note 13, at 312.
105. Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 495, 503 (1988). "[A] casenote at the beginning of the negligence
chapter proclaims that the use of the term 'reasonable man' currently is outmoded .... Id.
106. Bender, supra note 11, at 21.
107. Id. at 22.
108. Id. at 23; see also Abrams, supra note 8, at 1189. Conforming to male norms "occurs
mainly because the men who constitute the workplace, like most proponents of societally
dominant standards, do not recognize the partiality of their norms." Id.
109. Collins, supra note 13, at 315.
110. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 6-23 (1982) (making general observations on the history of sex
discrimination).
111. Id. at 171. Gilligan further contends:
[M]en and women may speak different languages that they assume are the same,
using similar words to encode disparate experiences of self and social relationships.
Because these languages share an overlapping moral vocabulary, they contain a pro-
pensity for systematic mistranslation, creating misunderstandings which impede com-
munication and limit the potential for cooperation and care in relationships....
As we have listened for centuries to the voices of men and the theories of develop-
ment that their experience informs, so we have come more recently to notice not only
the silence of women but the difficulty in hearing what they say when they speak. Yet in
the different voice of women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the tie between relation-
ships and responsibility, and the origins of aggression in the failure of connection. The
failure to see the different reality of women's lives and to hear the differences in their
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tern needs to account for these disparities to discount its historical
gender bias against women." 2 Legal commentators agree that men and
women possess differing attitudes concerning conduct in the work-
place.' 3 Although women may differ among themselves as to what con-
stitutes appropriate workplace behavior, a greater disparity exists
between men and women on the issue of sexual harassment."
4
Today, most courts utilize the reasonable person standard in defining
and analyzing negligent conduct. 1 5 Adopting a reasonable woman stan-
dard in assessing reasonableness in sexual harassment cases, however,
will define as sexual harassment conduct that a reasonable woman would
find offensive." 6 The ultimate mission of the reasonable woman stan-
dard is to change existing discriminatory practices against women in the
workforce." 7 Employing the reasonable woman standard provides more
female employees an opportunity to be successful in asserting sexual
harassment claims than under the reasonable person standard." 8
The reasonable woman standard will not establish a higher standard
that affords women more protection than men. 1 9 Analyzing conduct
from the female's perspective will still not permit highly sensitive female
employees to prevail on sexual harassment charges.'2 Adoption of the
reasonable woman standard makes the specific victim's perspective para-
mount in the assessment of a sexual harassment claim. 2' This standard
also will proscribe conduct that had not been considered actionable. 22
voices stems in part from the assumption that there is a single mode of social experi-
ence and interpretation. By positing instead two different modes, we arrive at a more
complex rendition of human experience which sees the truth of separation and attach-
ment in the lives of women and men and recognizes how these truths are carried by
different modes of language and thought.
Id. at 173-74.
112. Martha T. McCluskey, Rethinking Equality and Difference: Disability Discrimination
in Public Transportation, 97 YALE LJ. 863, 868 (1988).
113. Abrams, supra note 8, at 1205.
114. Id.; see also Winterbauer, supra note 101, at 817.
115. See 57A AM. JuR. 2D Negligence § 145 (1989).
116. See Winterbauer, supra note 101, at 817.
117. Id. at 818.
118. Id.
119. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
120. See Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp. 283, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
121. See Ernest Calderon, Two More Nails in the Coffin of Paternalism, ARiz. ATr'y,
Sept. 28, 1991, at 14.
122. See Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587, 607 (W.D. Mich. 1986). The court con-
cluded that a supervisor who thrust a shotgun into a female employee's crotch and placed a
flashlight between her legs, moving it up and out, was not sexual harassment. The court stated
of this conduct: "It was not intended ... to be an act of a sexual nature.... Nor do I believe a
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B. Development of the Reasonable Woman Standard
The reasonable woman standard emerged from the analysis of sexual
harassment claims in the Sixth Circuit in a fiery dissenting opinion."'
Vivienne Rabidue was discharged because she had trouble getting along
with co-workers and customers. 24 Rabidue asserted charges of sexual
harassment against her male supervisor, whom she claimed used ex-
tremely vulgar and crude language.'" Rabidue's supervisor regularly
"referred to women as 'whores,' 'cunt,' 'pussy,' and 'tits.'"'" 6 He called
Rabidue a "fat ass" and told her, "All [you] ... need[ ] is a good lay."'" 7
The company's management was aware of the supervisor's conduct, but
was unable to successfully curb it.'28
In addition to being the recipient of offensive conduct by her supervi-
sor, the entire job atmosphere was described as hostile. Other male em-
ployees brought photos of nude or nearly nude women to work.' 29 A
poster exhibited on the walls of the workplace for eight years showed a
naked woman lying on her back with a golf ball between her breasts. 3
Also in the poster was a man standing over the woman with a golf club
ready to strike the golf ball, yelling, "Fore.' 3' Trial testimony further
disclosed that female employees other than Rabidue were also offended
by the workplace atmosphere. 32
The court found that although the supervisor's vulgar language was
"annoying," it was not so unexpected as to be seriously detrimental to
the female employees.133 The majority, mimicking the district court's
holding, stated:
The sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect on
the plaintiff's work environment when considered in the context
of a society that condones and publicly features and commercially
exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at the news-
reasonable woman would have found it to be an act of sexual harassment, or to have unrea-
sonably interfered with her employment situation. Childish, yes; sexual harassment, no." Id.
123. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
124. Id. at 615.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 615.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 622.
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stands, on prime-time television, at the cinema, and in other pub-
lic places.'3
In dissent, Judge Damon Keith severely criticized the standard uti-
lized by the majority for determining whether Rabidue's supervisor had
subjected her to actionable sexual harassment.135 He maintained that
the reasonable person standard proves inadequate in responding to wo-
men's views of suitable workplace conduct when contrasted to the views
of men. 36 Judge Keith proposed a reasonable victim, or a reasonable
woman standard, in analyzing the different concepts of appropriate be-
havior in the workplace. 37 He argued that the majority somehow be-
lieved women assume the risk of being the object of crude and offensive
working environments. 138 No woman, insisted Judge Keith, should have
to work in surroundings where her "sexual dignity and reasonable sensi-
bilities are visually, verbally, or physically assaulted as a matter of pre-
vailing male prerogative.' ' 39
Judge Keith also disagreed with the majority's assertion that sexually
oriented posters and the hatred evinced by the male employees had only
a de minimis effect on the female employees."4  Alternatively, he as-
serted that the posters and vulgar conduct confirmed that women are
still viewed as sex objects. 4' Judge Keith argued that women do not
generally condone such degrading sexuality, and the reasonable woman
standard would support this proposition. 42 In closing, Judge Keith said
of the majority's analysis: "[T]he relevant inquiry at hand is what the
134. Id. In the district court, the majority concluded:
Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not
meant to ... change this. It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court
mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity for the female workers of
America. But it is quite different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a
magical transformation in the social mores of American workers.
Id. at 620-21 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984),
affd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)).
135. Id. at 625 (Keith, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting).
137. Id. Judge Keith maintained that "unless the outlook of the reasonable woman is
adopted, the defendants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrained notions of
reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men." Id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 626-27 (Keith, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 627 (Keith, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting). "That some men would condone and wish to perpetrate
such behavior is not surprising." Id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
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reasonable woman would find offensive, not society, which at one point
also condoned slavery."'143
One year later, a different panel of the Sixth Circuit"' utilized the
reasonable woman standard to determine whether conduct that two fe-
male employees were subjected to constituted sexual harassment. 45
Two female employees, Charolette Yates and Cheryl Mathis, alleged
their mutual supervisor desired to have sexual relations with them.'46
The supervisor began discussing personal sexual relations with his
first secretary, Mathis, during working hours. 4 7 He also flooded her
with invitations for drinks and meals, and was so bold as to invite himself
to her home. 48 Mathis refused these unwelcome invitations and was
then subjected to lewd comments regarding her physical appearance.14 9
Mathis eventually suffered a breakdown, was hospitalized on two differ-
ent occasions, and took an extended leave of absence.' 50
Upon her return from sick leave, the harassment resumed with more
lewd jokes and comments.' 5 ' Mathis resisted as best she could the on-
slaught of offensive conduct, and thereafter the supervisor bombarded
her with work.' 52 When Mathis again sought medical leave, Yates as-
sumed Mathis's position and was subjected to similar conduct from the
supervisor.' In addition to the behavior Mathis endured, the supervi-
sor also frequently called Yates to his office so he could watch her exit
the office and groan.' 54 Yates thereafter left Avco's employment.' 5
The record was referred to a magistrate who found that both women
had been subjected to sexual harassment, and the district court adopted
this finding.' 56 In analyzing the claims, the court adopted the reasonable
woman standard promulgated by Judge Keith 157 to determine whether
the working conditions the two women were subjected to were suffi-
143. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
144. Yates v. Avco Corp, 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987).
145. Id. at 637.
146. Id. at 631-32.
147. Id. at 632.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 633.
157. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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ciently perturbing. 5 s The court recognized that men and women are ap-
palled by different conduct and in different ways. The court further
noted it would implement a reasonable man standard in the event a man
was the target of the sexually oriented conduct.15 9 The court heightened
the urgency of a standard relating to the victim's gender by acknowledg-
ing the inherent differences in the perceptions of certain behavior by
men and women.160
In 1991, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of sexual harassment
via the reasonable woman standard on direct appeal. 1" The court's
analysis altered the standard for determining whether sexually laden
conduct is severe and pervasive from the traditional reasonable person
standard to the reasonable woman standard. 62 The Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that "courts 'should consider the victim's perspective and not ster-
eotyped notions of acceptable behavior"' in making the standard
change.163
The plaintiff, Kerry Ellison, worked as an agent for the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS). She agreed to have lunch with a co-worker, Sterling
Gray, and thereafter Gray began to pester her.164 Gray also sent Ellison
several peculiar notes.165 Ellison reported this conduct to her supervisor
and asked if she could try to handle the situation herself.166 Ellison was
scheduled to be away from the office, and while away, Gray sent her a
second note. 67
158. Yates, 819 F.2d at 636. The court stated:
In a sexual harassment case involving a male supervisor's harassment of a female
subordinate, it seems only reasonable that the person standing in the shoes of the em-
ployee should be "the reasonable woman" since the plaintiff in this type of case is
required to be a member of a protected class and is by definition female.
Id. at 637. In a footnote, the court recognized that the reasonable man standard would be
utilized if a male had been the subject of the harassment. Id. at 637 n.2.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
162. Id. at 879.
163. Id. at 878 (citing EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615, 3112 C, at 3242 (1988)).
164. Id. at 873.
165. Id. at 874. The first note read: "I cried over you last night and I'm totally drained
today. I have never been in such constant term oil [sic]. Thank you for talking with me. I
could not stand to feel your hatred for another day." Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. This second note read:
I know that you are worth knowing with or without sex.... Leaving aside the hassles
and disasters of recent weeks. I have enjoyed you so much over these past few months.
Watching you. Experiencing you from 0 [sic] so far away. Admiring your style and
elan.... Don't you think it odd that two people who have never even talked together,
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Ellison became frightened, spoke with her supervisor, and requested
either she or Gray be transferred. 68 Gray was subsequently transferred
after a counseling session with the supervisor, where Gray was told to
leave Ellison alone. 169 Gray filed a union grievance, and a settlement
allowed him to ultimately transfer back to the same office where Ellison
worked.17 ° When Ellison received word of Gray's return, she filed a for-
mal sexual harassment complaint.' 7' In the interim, Gray wrote Ellison
a third note insisting that he and Ellison were involved in a sexual rela-
tionship. 72 The IRS rejected Ellison's claim because a pattern or habit
of sexual harassment had not been sufficiently alleged. 73 Ellison next
sought relief in federal district court, which decided she failed to make a
prima facie showing of hostile work environment sexual harassment. 174
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 175 The court's opinion inti-
mated that the victim's perspective should be considered in weighing the
pervasiveness and severity of sexual harassment. 76 Because men and
women perceive certain conduct differently, the perspective of the indi-
vidual being harassed should be accounted for. 177 Conduct that a male
may see as tenable, a woman may find offensive and objectionable. 78
The court maintained that the reasonable woman standard would pro-
vide a fairer assessment in determining whether the sexual conduct of
the harasser was objectionable. 79
alone, are striking off such intense sparks.... I will [write] another letter in the near
future.
Id. (alterations in original).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 874-75.
173. Id. at 875.
174. Id. The district court maintained Gray's conduct was merely trivial and isolated. Id.
at 876. As such, a hostile work environment could not be found because isolated and sporadic
conduct is not actionable for this type of sexual harassment. Barbetta v. Chemlawn Serv.
Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 572-73 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Merriman & Yang, supra note 41, at 95.
175. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 873. The court concluded Gray's conduct was "somewhere be-
tween forcible rape and the mere utterance of an epithet." Id. at 877.
176. Id. at 878. "If we only examined whether a reasonable person would engage in alleg-
edly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimina-
tion." Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. The court acknowledged that although women as a group may not have the same
perspective on all forms of conduct, as a whole they harbor traditional apprehensions that
men do not. Id. at 879.
179. Id.
[Vol. 77:85
THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD
The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasonable woman standard because it
believed that the "sex-blind[ed] reasonable person standard tends to be
male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of wo-
men."'180 The court believed that espousing the reasonable woman stan-
dard would create a "gender-conscious" scrutiny of conduct which tends
to be found in sexual harassment. This gender consciousness would, in
turn, equalize the workplace. 181 Embracing the reasonable woman stan-
dard would not classify all conduct at the workplace as sexual harass-
ment, but only that which a reasonable victim of the same sex as the
plaintiff would see as objectionable.' 2
Critically examining Gray's conduct, the court likened him to a con-
temporary "Cyrano de Bergerac," and concluded that because Ellison
became frightened by the letters, and because her supervisor had a
prompt response to the complaints, any reasonable woman would have
experienced the same reaction. 183 The court furthermore believed that
espousing the reasonable woman standard would be the first step for the
courts to eliminate long-standing attitudes contemplating appropriate
and acceptable behavior in the workplace.' s4 In drawing to a close on
this issue, the court stated, "We hope that over time both men and wo-
men will learn what conduct offends reasonable members of the oppo-
site sex. When employers and employees internalize the standard of
workplace conduct we establish today, the current gap in perception be-
tween the sexes will be bridged.' ' 8 5
In addition to the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, district courts in at least
three other circuits have proposed adoption of the reasonable woman
standard. 8 6 Justifications for approving the reasonable woman standard
for analyzing workplace conduct include accounting for the lack of wo-
180. Id. Like the Sixth Circuit in Yates, the Ninth Circuit stated that when a male is the
recipient of the sexually offensive conduct, the reasonable man standard is appropriate. Id. at
879 n.11.
181. Id. at 879.
182. Id. at 880. The court noted that sexual behavior welcomed by the female employee
would not constitute sexual harassment. Id. at 880 n.13.
183. Id. at 880. "A reasonable woman could consider Gray's conduct, as alleged by Effi-
son, sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter a condition of employment and create an abu-
sive working environment." Id.
184. Id. at 881.
185. Id.
186. See Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424 (D. Ariz. 1992); Smolsky v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp.
1509 (D. Me. 1991); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991); Lipsett v. Rive-Mora, 669 F. Supp. 1188 (D. P.R. 1987), rev'd in part sub nor. Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
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men in a particular field,187 protecting the employer from the hypersensi-
tive employee, 88 and paralleling the analysis for sexual harassment to
the analysis for race discrimination. 18 9 One court also allowed expert
testimony to establish the validity of the different points of view between
men and women.' 90
V. EVALUATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT DECISIONS IN THE
SEVENTH CIRCUrr
In 1985, the Seventh Circuit articulated its belief that Title VII pro-
hibited sexual harassment by an employee's supervisor, but reserved
opinion as to Title VII's application to co-employees.' 91 Vera Horn filed
suit against her former employer, asserting that she was terminated be-
cause she rejected the sexual advances of her supervisor, Frank Haas.
The alleged suggestive behavior occurred by way of obscene gestures,
lewd comments, and sexual leers.' 9 Specifically, Haas grilled her about
her sexual desires since her divorce and avowed to make her work expe-
rience easier if she indulged him.'9 3
The Seventh Circuit evaluated Haas's conduct and stated that the be-
havior "constitutes precisely the kind of 'artificial, arbitrary, and unnec-
essary barriers to employment,' that Title VII was intended to
prevent.'1 94 The court adopted the EEOC's Guidelines, which imposed
strict liability on employers for the conduct of its supervisors. 95 Be-
cause the conduct at issue constituted quid pro quo sexual harassment,
the court never reached the issue of an appropriate standard for evaluat-
ing hostile work environment sexual harassment.'96
One year later, in 1986, the Seventh Circuit recognized employer lia-
bility for hostile work environment sexual harassment. 97 Carol
Zabkowicz worked in a warehouse in West Bend, Wisconsin.' 98
Zabkowicz's brother-in-law became employed at the same facility, and
the warm relationship she shared with other employees began to dis-
187. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524.
188. Smolsky, 780 F. Supp. at 294-95.
189. Harris, 765 F. Supp. at 1515.
190. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1502-09.
191. Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 1985).
192. Id. at 601.
193. Id. at 601-02.
194. Id. at 603 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
195. Id. at 604-05.
196. Id. at 604.
197. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
198. Id. at 542.
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integrate.199 As a result of the conduct she endured, Zabkowicz sought
several medical leaves and was diagnosed as suffering from gastrointesti-
nal disease resulting from the sexual harassment she experienced at
work.2
00
A charge was filed with the EEOC, motivating disciplinary proceed-
ings against the co-employees involved2 01 Only then did the harassment
cease.202 Again, no standard was articulated by the Seventh Circuit for
determining when certain workplace conduct becomes severe and perva-
sive enough to state a cause of action for hostile work environment sex-
ual harassment.
Three months later, the Seventh Circuit articulated a standard for
determining when hostile work environment sexual harassment becomes
actionable.20 3 Maxine Scott was training to work as an auto mechanic at
Sears. 0 4 Scott alleged that the senior mechanic subjected her to a hos-
tile work environment. 2 5 She alleged that the male senior mechanic in-
cessantly propositioned her, winked at her, and suggested that he give
her a massage.20 6 Scott further alleged that a co-worker slapped her on
the buttocks and that another said, "[S]he must moan and groan while
having sex."207
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court's establish-
ment of hostile work environment sexual harassment as a viable cause of
action.' s The court alluded that victims of such conduct are most often
female.20 9 By acknowledging that women are more likely to be victims
of sexual harassment, the court was only a step away from looking at the
offensive conduct from the victim's, and hence the female's, perspective.
Instead, the court adopted the district court's conclusion that the con-
duct was not severe, crippling, or pervasive enough to be actionable. 21 0
199. Id. The district court had concluded that a sexual harassment "campaign" had been
waged against Zabkowicz. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
204. Id. at 211.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 211-12.
208. Id. at 212-13.
209. Id. at 213. "Such severe harassment becomes discriminatory because it deprives the
victim (usually female) of the right to participate in the work place on equal footing with
others similarly situated." Id.
210. Id. at 213-14. The district court had adopted an objective test in analyzing hostile
work environment sexual harassment: "[W]hether an employee is sexually harassed is gener-
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In 1989, the Seventh Circuit finally articulated a standard to analyze
workplace behavior in hostile work environment sexual harassment
claims."1' The court abstained from adopting the Sears court's objective
test, and articulated a two-pronged inquiry.212
Helen Brooms, a black nurse, was subjected to both racial and sexual
innuendos by the human resources manager of the company.213 The
conduct continued despite her avoidance of the manager's sexual ad-
vances and protests to the sexual comments. 1 4 Brooms complained
about the manager's conduct, and he was subsequently reprimanded.1 5
The conduct resumed a month later, however, when he showed Brooms
two photos, one portraying an interracial act of sodomy and the other
depicting bestiality.1 6 He indicated that she was hired for the purposes
indicated in the photos.2 7 The manager also threatened to kill
Brooms.21 8 Brooms subsequently left work to seek medical assistance
for depression caused by the incessant abuse. 19
The Seventh Circuit adopted a two-pronged test, incorporating both
a subjective and an objective standard for assessing the feasibility of a
hostile work environment cause of action.22 The court cited Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co.221 as adopting the same standard.' - The court ar-
ticulated its test:
[A] district court must... [consider] the likely effect of a defend-
ant's conduct upon a reasonable person's ability to perform his or
her work and upon his or her well-being, as well as the actual
effect upon the particular plaintiff bringing the claim. Only if the
court concludes that the conduct would adversely affect the work
performance and the well-being of both a reasonable person and
ally an objective determination and... the focus of the question of sexual harassment should
be upon the defendant's conduct, not the plaintiff's perception or reaction to the defendant's
conduct." Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 605 F. Supp. 1047, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd, 798
F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
211. Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989).
212. Id. at 418.
213. Id. at 416.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 417.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 418.
221. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
222. Brooms, 881 F.2d at 418-19.
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the particular plaintiff bringing the action may it find that the de-
fendant has violated the plaintiff's rights under Title VII z
The court concluded that a reasonable person's work performance
would have been interfered with and that the reasonable employee's
psychological health would have been at risk because of the manager's
conduct. 4 The Seventh Circuit continues to analyze hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment using this two-pronged standard.2"
VI. ADOPTION OF THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD IN THE
SEVENTH CIRcurr
The drawback of the Seventh Circuit's present two-pronged standard
is that it fails to account solely for the perspective of women who are the
targets of sexually degrading and offensive conduct. The Seventh Cir-
cuit's standard looks at the conduct from the perspective of both the
reasonable person and the reasonable woman (the victim). However,
this two-pronged standard fails to properly account for the victim's reac-
tion because the reasonable person's perspective of the conduct may be
drastically different. The Seventh Circuit should seek to eliminate the
prong that considers the workplace conduct from the perspective of the
reasonable person. In doing so, the standard would assess the conduct
solely from the reasonable victim's, and more often the reasonable wo-
man's, perspective.
Women are disproportionately the victims of workplace sexual har-
assment.1 6 Articulating an objective standard for reasonable conduct
does not consider the disparities that exist between men and women in
judging what constitutes objectionable behavior.22 7 Conduct that male
employees see as innocent could very well be objectionable in today's
workplace.228 Although congressional legislation will never rid all refer-
223. Id. at 419.
224. Id. at 420.
225. See Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1990); King v.
Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990).
226. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
227. Schoenheider, supra note 69, at 1486; see also Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d
611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting), cerL denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) ("[T]he rea-
sonable person perspective fails to account for the wide divergence between most women's
views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men.").
228. Cook, supra note 6, at 11. "'The difficulty is [managers'] perceptions of sex harass-
ment.., such as calling a female employee 'sweetie' or 'honey'. Sometimes .... what they
think is innocent, subtle, cute or normal is just unacceptable today." Id. (quoting Garrett
Reilly, manager of General Electric's employee compliance programs).
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ences to sex and sexual conduct from the workplace,229 utilizing the wo-
man's perspective will aid in diminishing the prevalent use of such
behavior. Adopting the reasonable woman standard will provide recog-
nition that the perspectives of women in the workforce are being consid-
ered and accepted. 0 Adopting the woman's perspective when women
are victims of sexual harassment will also encourage greater male aware-
ness to the repulsive nature of sexually laden behavior in the work-
place.2" Likewise, use of the standard will deter future objectionable
workplace conduct and create equality between men and women. 2
Acceptance of the reasonable woman standard means overcoming
objections raised by those who would continue to espouse a reasonable
person standard.21 3 One argument raised against adoption of the rea-
sonable woman standard is that men will be guilty of sexual harassment
even without knowing their conduct is severe and pervasive to the rea-
sonable woman.234 Several responses address this argument.
The Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady"5 argued that the reasonable
woman standard would force more employers to establish policies to
prevent future sexual harassment and to severely reprimand those who
engage in such conduct.236 A second response to this argument is that
regardless of whether the man realizes he has engaged in offensive be-
havior, the end product is that women are being forced to work in a
sexually offensive work environment.2 7 The purpose of enacting Title
VII was not to "codify prevailing sexist prejudices." 238
A third response to this argument is that no employee should have to
tolerate a working environment filled with verbal exploitation, unwanted
physical exchanges, or vulgar photographs of their gender.2 9 Behavior
alleged to constitute sexual harassment is often loathsome to reasonable
229. Fred W. Suggs, Jr., Advising Your Corporate Client on Avoiding Charges of Sexual
Harassment, 46 ALA. LAW. 176, 178 (1985).
230. See Collins, supra note 13, at 323.
231. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1459 (1984).
232. Id. at 1458.
233. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 880.
235. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
236. Id.
237. MACKiNNON, supra note 1, at 27. A 1976 study by Redbook Magazine stated that
75% of women receiving unwelcome sexual behavior characterize it as disconcerting, humili-
ating, or terrifying. Id. (citing REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 217).
238. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881.
239. Paul, supra note 11, at 345.
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people generally. 24 The purpose of the reasonable woman standard is
to combat existing stereotypes and common discriminatory practices that
have become prevalent in today's workplace. This objective cannot be
accomplished if we continue to look at the offensive conduct from a per-
spective other than the victim's.
A second challenge to adopting the reasonable woman standard
raises the issue of whether it is sensible to foster the reasonable woman's
perspective in evaluating the suitability of behavior by male co-workers
and/or supervisors. Legal scholars and courts contend that employing
this softer standard will allow the hypersensitive female employee to
prevail on petty claims.2 4
Confrontation of this challenge requires a realization that the stan-
dard is aimed at considering the societal differences between men and
women.242 Women have traditionally been expected to observe work-
place norms that have been propounded by men.243 Because men typi-
cally govern workplace conduct and are the perpetrators of sexual
harassment, they fail to contemplate how a woman will respond to the
conduct.244 The reasonable woman standard is meant to account for the
reasonable female's perspective. Thus, a mere compliment couched in
sexual terms will not constitute a prima facie showing of sexual
harassment.245
Although some legal scholars contend that sexual harassment claims
for hostile work environment are petty, a closer examination of the issue
will show that is not the case.246 Only conduct that a reasonable woman
240. Id.
241. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 885 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
242. Abrams, supra note 8, at 1185.
243. Id. at 1189.
244. Id. at 1202-03.
245. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
246. EDMUND WALL, SEXUAL HARAssMENr CONFRONTATIONS AND DECISIONS, 227
(1992). The cases show that the alleged harassing conduct is really quite shocking. Id.; see
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (Female employee was told that sexually
harassing conduct might stop if she submitted to the propositions.); Bundy v. Jackson, 641
F.2d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (The female who had to contend with her supervisor's sexual
advances complained and was told that "[a]ny man in his right mind would want to rape
you."); Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424, 427 (D. Ariz. 1992) (Female employee was
nicknamed "I.B.T.," an abbreviation for "itty bitty titties," and was poked in the buttocks by a
co-worker who said he was "checking to see if 'the meat was done."'); Robinson v. Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1498 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (Female employee had to en-
dure remarks such as "Hey pussy cat, come here and give me a whiff," "The more you lick it
the harder it gets," "I'd like to get in bed with that," and "I'd like to have some of that.");
Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp 1487, 1492 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (Female employee
who was forced to have sex with her supervisor had to endure him putting a pistol into her
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finds adequately severe and pervasive to create a hostile and offensive
work environment will be actionable.247 To many women who are vic-
tims of sexual harassment, it is crystal clear when they have been
harassed within the definition of Title VII.248 The standard itself is pro-
gressive, and courts should recognize that a woman's perspective of what
constitutes acceptable workplace behavior will in all likelihood change
over the years.249
Acceptance and implementation of the reasonable woman standard
requires the recognition that claims which may have failed under the
reasonable person standard will conceivably succeed under the reason-
able woman standard.150 The reasonable woman standard is not meant
to allow all allegations of sexual harassment to prevail, but to judge the
reasonableness of the conduct from the victim's (i.e., the woman's) view-
point. The reasonable woman is not less reasonable than the genderless
reasonable person." Her viewpoint of what constitutes reasonable and
appropriate workplace behavior is the only difference and should be
properly accounted for.
Despite the expression of opinion against adoption of the reasonable
woman standard, the standard has substantially more foundation for its
support. Women have had to face sexual harassment in the workforce
for decades 52 Sexual harassment advocates degradation of women by
reinforcing their historically subordinate function in the workplace. z 3
The consequences of sexual harassment to the employer are tremen-
vagina and cocking it.); Lipsett v. Rive-Mora, 669 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (D. P.R. 1987), rev'd in
part sub nom. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (Plaintiff, a
female surgeon, was told by her male supervisor that women were not fit to be surgeons and
could not be relied upon when menstruating or "in heat."); Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp.
587, 598 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (A male co-worker thrust his shotgun case into the plaintiff's
crotch, put it up to his nose, and said, "Umm, smells good.").
247. WALL, supra note 246, at 227-28.
248. PETROCELLI & REPA, supra note 3, at 2/27.
249. Winterbauer, supra note 101, at 818 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876 (9th
Cir. 1991)).
250. Id. at 818.
251. See generally Linzer & Tidwell, supra note 17, at 863 ("[W]e should be aware that
these multiple points of view are always present before we talk about reasonableness at all.");
Collins, supra note 13, at 323 ("The meaning of reasonableness should in the future be con-
strued to allow for a gender-free standard, which can be respected by all people who value its
meaning.").
252. Schoenheider, supra note 69, at 1461.
253. CoNrE, supra note 3, at 5.
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dous. 254 The possibility for psychological harm caused by sexual harass-
ment requires both courts and employers to accept a standard that
contemplates a woman's perception of acceptable workplace conduct.255
The cost of sexual harassment to the federal government is likewise as-
tronomical. 56 Application of the reasonable woman standard should ul-
timately lower this cost once employers and employees become aware of
the kinds of conduct in the workplace that can be actionable.
Sanctioning offensive, crude, and unbusiness-like sexual behavior in
the workplace will only serve to reinforce the subordination and inequal-
ity of women in the workplace5 7 Ignoring the viewpoint of the victim
(the woman) will result in an abuse of economic power over the woman
in the workplace.2 8 The courts are not immune from historical norms
that have pervaded the workplace?5 9 The courts must be the first place
to institute a change that will have an immense impact on the future
workplace for women. Eliminating employment discrimination against
women and changing societal norms about appropriate workplace con-
duct requires the courts to propound a standard that analyzes sexual har-
assment by a woman's sensory experience. 6 °
VII. CONCLUSION
The reasonable woman standard was not articulated to provide wo-
men with greater protection in the workplace than men. The standard
254. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. The victim may suffer headaches, ner-
vousness, insomnia, depression, and even emotional breakdowns. Schoenheider, supra note
69, at 1464.
255. Marlisa Vinciguerra, The Aftermath ofMeritor: A Search for Standards in the Law of
Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE LJ. 1717, 1737-38 (1989).
256. Deborah S. Brenneman, Comment, From a Woman's Point of View. The Use of the
Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1281, 1298-99
(1992). A study by the Merit Systems Protection Board indicates the cost of sexual harass-
ment to the federal government exceeded $100,000,000 per year. Id.
257. Schoenheider, supra note 69, at 1465.
258. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 1. MacKinnon states:
Intimate violation of women by men is sufficiently pervasive in American society as to
be nearly invisible. Contained by internalized and structured forms of power, it has
been nearly inaudible. [It has c]onjoined with men's control over women's material
survival....
Central to the concept is the use of power derived from one social sphere to lever
benefits or impose deprivations in another.... American society legitimizes male sex-
ual dominance of women and employer's control of [female] workers [by allowing sex-
ual harassment to prevail in the workplace].
Id. at 1-2.
259. Brenneman, supra note 256, at 1299-304.
260. Abrams, supra note 8, at 1206.
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
was implemented to give women a chance to reject the welcomeness of
any workplace conduct that a woman finds objectionable, but that her
male co-worker does not. Assessing suitable workplace behavior from
the woman's perspective will help to reduce, if not eliminate, sexual ine-
quality in the workplace.
The Seventh Circuit should take a definitive step and alter its two-
pronged test for hostile work environment sexual harassment by elimi-
nating the prong analyzing whether the reasonable person would find
the conduct sufficiently severe and pervasive, and instead adopting the
reasonable woman standard. As one legal scholar wrote, "[t]he perspec-
tive of the reasonable man [or the reasonable person] who has not ex-
perienced the plaintiff's harassment is no more objective [than the
reasonable woman], it simply reflects a different type of subjectivity."26'
Because women are more likely than men to be afflicted by offensive
workplace behavior, adopting the woman's perspective will allow courts
and employers to realize that conduct once condoned in the workplace is
no longer appropriate and acceptable behavior among employees, unless
mutually solicited.
SALLY A. PREaER
261. Id. at 1210.
[Vol. 77:85
